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American children view an average of four hours of television per
day,' a total of approximately 15,000 hours by the time they reach
age 18. No single activity except sleep occupies as much of their
time.2 For children, television content is entertaining and educa-
tional; the medium imparts many messages to children about soci-
ety, its values, and its expectations. Indeed, it has been argued that
for children, all television is educational, and the question is simply,
"What is it teaching?"
In the past, there has been considerable concern about the learn-
ing of antisocial behavior from television, especially aggressive be-
havior modeled on violent program content. Certainly such
concern with the impact of mass media on children and youth pre-
dates television. Books have been written on the effects of comics, 3
and 13 volumes resulted from a series of studies in the early 1930s
on the impact of motion pictures. 4 Such concerns almost always
have focused on the negative impacts of media, and the major study
on television's effects conducted by the U.S. Surgeon General in
1972 was no exception. 5 In general, however, policy action based
on negative-effects research has been stymied by first amendment
concerns, since most reform proposals involved elements of content
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1. 1986 A.C. Nielsen Report on Television.
2. See generally Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, I Television and Behavior: Ten Years of
Scientific Progress and Implications for the Eighties (1982).
3. See, e.g., F. Wertham, Seduction of the Innocent (1954).
4. The results of these studies are collected in W. Charters, Motion Pictures and
Youth: A Summary (1933).
5. U.S. Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Comm. on Television & Social Behav-
ior, Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Televi-
sion and Growing Up: The Impact of Televised Violence (1972) [hereinafter Surgeon
General's Report].
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control or content prohibition. Regulation of content, even content
that portrays undesirable behaviors, is generally prohibited. 6 As a
result of such constitutional concerns, as well as changing philoso-
phies of communication regulation, policy bodies responsible for
regulation increasingly have removed themselves from content
decisions. 7
There are several intertwined issues in a policy-oriented approach
to children and television. The first concerns the currently available
fare of broadcast programming produced for a child audience.
While children view several hours of television a day, only a small
percentage of their total viewing, perhaps as low as 12-15%, mostly
clustered on Saturday mornings and after school, is of programming
produced specifically for them. 8 Children view a considerable
amount of programming that is intended to be viewed, understood,
and reacted to by adults. Thus the second concern-the impact of
television content-is important because children lack access to di-
verse content aimed at appropriate social and cognitive levels.
Were there more child-oriented fare from which to choose, children
probably would be less exposed to inappropriate program content
and consequently less likely to be affected in a negative manner.
Some have argued that television content is more diverse today
than it ever has been.9 Cited are advances in cable services, satellite
transmissions, low power television in urban settings, educational
and cultural content on public broadcasting stations, and the popu-
larity and potential of video cassette recorders (VCRs). Several re-
cent policy decisions on the responsibilities of commercial
broadcasters have been based on the increasing availability of alter-
native video fare. Unfortunately, while this situation of abundance
may be true for adult-oriented fare, the amount and quality of com-
mercially broadcast informational or educational television'0 for
6. Exceptions include obscene, indecent, or profane content, 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1982), FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), or content that incites or en-
dangers the public, Schenck vs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) indicated its difficulty with
decision-making on any other than a content-neutral basis in In re Children's Television
Programming and Advertising Practices, 96 FCC 2d 634 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Or-
der]. This decision was upheld by a U.S. Court of Appeals in Action for Children's
Television vs. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
8. 1985 A.C. Nielsen Report on Television.
9. Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L.
Rev. 207-57 (1982).
10. It is difficult precisely to define educational or infornational programming, since
such definitions involve considerable subjective evaluations. However, it is possible to
provide examples of programming that could be considered educational or informative,




children have not improved, and may be at one of their lowest
points since the introduction of the medium." Indeed, for every
gain in alternative video content, it seems as if there has been a loss
in commercially broadcast content for children. A few citizens'
groups, such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI),
the National Congress of Parents and Teachers (PTA), the National
Education Association (NEA), and most notably Action for Chil-
dren's Television (ACT), have lobbied for, filed lawsuits on behalf
of, and otherwise attempted to represent the interests and needs of
children against those of commercial broadcasting corporations.
Their successes, however, have been both hard-fought and infre-
quent. Similarly, a few individuals in Congress have been willing to
legislate on behalf of children in this area, but the legislative process
has yet to achieve and implement significant solutions.
This article briefly analyzes the state of television for children, ex-
plores the history of the policy initiatives that have sought to im-
prove television for children, and suggests options that are likely to
be most effective in the present climate of broadcast regulation.
I. History of Broadcaster Programming Responsibilities
Commercial broadcasting is regulated by the Communications
Act of 1934,12 which represented an effort to guarantee universal
telephone service and radio reception to citizens by establishing
standards for broadcasting frequencies and regulating the use of lo-
cal frequencies to eliminate interference. Section 309(a) of the
Communications Act provides that broadcast airwaves belong to the
American public; broadcasters can have "free and exclusive use" of
such airwaves for a fixed period of time, but in return they are re-
quired to serve in the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."
As the technology of television advanced, the industry divided on
the issue of whether it was ready to enter the world of commercial
broadcasting. Much of the indecision was tied to the lack of agreed-
on standards for broadcasting and receiving. Media historian Erik
Barnouw has noted that RCA president David Sarnoff almost imme-
native and exciting ways in which the medium can be used to further a child's under-
standing of a wide range of areas: history, science, literature, the environment, drama,
music, fine arts, human relations, other cultures and languages, and basic skills such as
reading and mathematics which are crucial to a child's development." Children's Televi-
sion Report and Policy Statement, 50 FCC 2d 1 (1974), aff'd sub nom., Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter 1974 Policy
Statement].
11. See Hechinger, TV's Pitch to Children, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1987, at A19, col. 3.
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-610 (1982).
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diately sought the cooperation of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or the Commission), the regulatory body created
by the Act, in setting technical standards for television as well as
allocating spectrum space.' 3 Apparently governmental oversight, if
not welcomed, certainly was not resisted.1 4
Because of fear that the government might intrude in the area of
media content control, the FCC initially avoided specific rules on
how broadcasters might fulfill their public interest obligations. This
avoidance resulted in considerable confusion and wide variations in
services and programming offered by individual broadcasters. With
the impending mass availability of television, the FCC set about to
provide more specific requirements for serving in the public inter-
est, and in 1946 it released a set of standards, entitled Public Service
Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees. Among other suggestions, the
FCC encouraged broadcasters to provide adequate noncommercial
programming (local and network), live local programs, and pro-
grams devoted to discussion of public issues.' 5 However, broad-
casters as well as influential members of Congress charged that by
specifying content, the FCC was placing itself in the role of censor.
As a result, the standards were never systematically enforced. 16
In 1960, after more than two decades of television broadcasting,
the FCC declared that broadcasters were not adequately fulfilling
their public interest responsibilities. It issued a policy statement' 7
that affirmed broadcasters' responsibilities to ascertain the needs
and interests of the viewers whom they served, and to provide pro-
gramming to meet those needs and interests. The FCC set out 14
categories of programming that were necessary to meet the public
13. E. Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television 74-77
(1977). Broadcasters had increased their public service radio programming considera-
bly prior to passage of the Act. Barnouw implies that this was done in response to grow-
ing concerns over the commercialization of radio. The increase in public service
programming was a way to defeat a proposed amendment to the Act that would have
canceled all existing commercial broadcasting licenses and awarded a minimum of 25%
of all newly awarded licenses to nonprofit organizations. The amendment, which at one
point appeared "within reach of success," id. at 74, was defeated, in no small part due to
congressional perceptions about the increase in public interest programming.
14. See generally R. Barrow, Development of Television: FCC Allocations and Stan-
dards, in American Broadcasting: A Sourcebook on the History of Radio and Television
602 (L. Lichty & M. Topping eds. 1975).
15. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 9.
16. L. Brown, Les Brown's Encyclopedia of Television 151-52 (1982).





interest obligation; among these was programming specifically
designed for children.'
The public interest in children's programming had increasingly
become evident. As more American families bought television sets,
an increasing proportion of children's leisure time was devoted to
viewing television.' 9 Policymakers began to express interest in the
content of television programming. Early hearings focusing on vio-
lence and antisocial content were conducted by congressional sub-
committees in 1952, 1954, and 1955.20 Informal pressures were
brought to bear on broadcasters to reduce the amount of crime and
aggression in programs that were viewed by children and, espe-
cially, adolescents. Broadcasters, on the other hand, argued that
there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that juvenile delin-
quency or aggressive behavior resulted from exposure to television.
However, by the early 1960s, researchers produced the first experi-
mental evidence on the negative impact of televised content on
behavior. 21
Public concerns mounted and eventually led the government to
fund an investigation of television's impact on aggressive and anti-
social behavior. The research, consisting of several dozen individ-
ual studies, was conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Surgeon
General, and was funded by the federal government at a cost of
close to $1,500,000.22 The final report, carefully worded to satisfy
both the social scientists and industry representatives serving on the
12-member advisory panel appointed by the Surgeon General, indi-
cated that there was evidence of a causal relation between viewing
violence on television and children's learning and performing ag-
gressive behaviors. 23 This relationship was primarily evident in
18. Id. at 7295.
19. See generally W. Schramm, J. Lyle & E. Parker, Television in the Lives of Our
Children (1961).
20. Investigation of Radio and Television Programming: Hearings before the FCC
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1952); Juvenile Delinquency (Television Programs): Hearings before the Sub-
comm. to InvestigateJuvenile Delinquency, Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 83rd Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1954) & 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Juvenile Delinquency (Motion Pic-
tures): Hearings before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Senate
Comm. on theJudiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
21. See A. Bandura, D. Ross, & S. Ross, Transmission of Aggression Through Imita-
tion of Aggressive Models, 63J. Abnormal and Soc. Psych. 575 (1961); and A. Bandura,
D. Ross & S. Ross, Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models, 66J. Abnormal and
Soc. Psych. 3 (1963).
22. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 6, at 147-63. The results, presented in five
individual volumes of research reports, were "briefly" presented in this summary vol-
ume of 169 pages.
23. Id. at 11.
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those children who were "predisposed" to aggressive behavior.
Further, only some television violence occasioned aggressive behav-
ior, and then only when the children's environment supported ag-
gressive behavior. The report concluded that while such evidence
was convincing, further research was warranted. It carefully recom-
mended policy options that would originate from the programming
community rather than the legal or regulatory process, urging
broadcasters to show more consequences of violent actions, help
viewers identify with victims, produce more "high quality" drama,
and increase their investment in the positive educational potential
of television. 24
Despite the report's conclusion, and despite at least 10 Congres-
sional hearings focusing almost exclusively on the issue of violence,
no formal policy action resulted. While sensitized broadcasters did
make certain changes in broadcast content,25 violence has continued
to be a part of "prime time" television drama, and children, as view-
ers of a significant amount of prime time television, continue to be
exposed to violent and aggressive portrayals.
More recently, research on the impact of pornography on sexual
violence has renewed the concern that media portrayals of violence
have the potential to result in serious antisocial behavior. 26 The
most recent evidence, however, is based primarily on research with
adults, and the film content used in the research is not typical of that
provided by commercially broadcast television. As such, it is not
representative of content that children and adolescents-and indeed
most adults-would be likely to view. Thus, at least from a research
and policy perspective, the issue of televised violence and subse-
quent aggressive behavior among youth has not maintained the high
level of activity that characterized the preceding decade.
The Surgeon General's report did succeed, however, in spurring
research in the general area of children and the media, resulting in
works investigating the medium's impact on sex role and ethnic atti-
tudes, consumer attitudes and behavior, and on cognitive processes
such as attention, comprehension, imagination, and affective devel-
24. Id. at 126-27.
25. Especially in the area of children's programming, guidelines were instituted to
eliminate unnecessary aggression. See Rushnell, Nonprimetime Programming, in Broad-
cast Programming 198 (S. Eastman, S. Head & L. Klein eds. 1981).
26. Much, but not all, of the current laboratory research indicates that exposure to
media portrayals of sexual violence and rape, especially when the victim's response is
positive, results in generally undesirable effects on male viewers of the presentations.
For a thorough review of the theory and the research, see Pornography and Sexual Ag-




opment. Much of the socialization research has been based on the
assumption that television "cultivates" values and behaviors similar
to those it presents in its symbolic drama and selective news and
informational programs. This cultivation is thought to have the
greatest effect on persons who watch a higher than average amount
of television.
In 1982, a 10-year update to the Surgeon General's report was
published by the National Institute for Mental Health. 27 The update
included reports on many of the cultivation studies, and provided
some support for the contention that the medium has a significant
impact on reinforcing the attitudes and beliefs of children, youth,
and in some cases, adults. However, experts have criticized this re-
port, and cultivation work in general, on a number of grounds,
ranging from questions about careless or incorrect methodology to
criticisms of its narrow scope. 28 Selected studies in this regard,
though, have provided evidence that television use is highly corre-
lated to children's learning about their world. This relationship is
especially strong for those children who have fewer alternative
sources of information-the ones who watch the most television.
Television's potential as a positive, as well as a negative, educa-
tional medium was also recognized early on, and generated consid-
erable research on the use of the medium compared with standard
educational methods. 29 By the mid-1960s an evaluation of the ex-
isting system of educational broadcasting in the United States led to
a report by the prestigious Carnegie Commission on Educational
Television. The Commission explored alternatives to commercially
broadcast television and ways to improve on the existing system of
educational television to provide even greater diversity of broadcast
fare. Based heavily on the recommendations of this January 1967
report, the Public Broadcasting Act was passed that year, creating a
system of nonprofit stations to provide diverse cultural and educa-
tional programming. It was understood that one intent of the new
system was to provide imaginative instructional programming for
27. 2 Television and Behavior: Ten Years of Scientific Progress and Implications for
the Eighties (D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet &J. Lazar eds. 1982).
28. Cook, Kendzierski & Thomas, The Implicit Assumptions of Television Research:
An Analysis of the 1982 NIMH Report on Television and Behavior, 47 Pub. Opinion Q.
161-201 (1983); Hirsch, The "Scary World" of the Nonviewer and Other Anomalies: A
Reanalysis of Gerbner et al.'s Findings on Cultivation Analysis (pt. I), 7 Comm. Res.
403-56 (1980).
29. See generally 10 Am. Psychologist 587 (1955).
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children.30 Several of the early successes on the new public televi-
sion stations were programs produced for children: Sesame Street,
Mister Roger's Neighborhood, and Electric Company. By the time the
original Surgeon General's Report was released, research using
some of these programs had demonstrated the medium's positive,
prosocial potential. In contrast to violent programs, which tended
to affect only children who already demonstrated aggressive tenden-
cies, prosocial programs such as Mister Roger's Neighborhood and Ses-
ame Street were shown to teach positive behaviors, such as
cooperation, empathy, and patience to children regardless of their
initial propensity to these behaviors.3 1
These programs, and a few others that aired on public television,
made it clear that the entertainment quality of children's program-
ming need not be sacrificed for educational outcomes.3 2 Most com-
mercially broadcast programming for children seemed insipid and
without significant educational value when compared with these
programs. In 1970, inspired by such programming success and dis-
appointed by the poor informational quality of commercial pro-
gramming, Action for Children's Television (ACT), a children's
media advocacy group formed in 1968, petitioned the FCC to re-
quire commercial broadcasters to air specific amounts of informa-
tional children's programming.3 s The Commission consequently
initiated a notice of inquiry (NOI) and a notice of proposed rule-
making (NPRM) in 1971, and solicited comments from a wide vari-
ety of sources. Contributors were to identify the problems as well as
suggest industry-based and regulatory methods to solve the
problems.3 4 After sorting through considerable public commen-
tary, the Commission released its results and recommendations in a
30. Carnegie Comm'n on Educational Television, Public Television: A Program for
Action (1967).
31. See Stein & Friedrich, The Impact of Television on Children and Youth, in Re-
view of Child Development Research (E.M. Hetherington ed. 1975).
32. The combination of entertainment and educational quality did not come easily.
For an account of the difficulty of achieving this success, see G. Lesser, Children and
Television: Lessons from Sesame Street (1974).
33. ACT asked the FCC to require commercial stations to air a minimum of 14 hours
per week of age-specific programming for children; the petition also requested that all
commercial sponsorship on television for children be prohibited. See 1974 Policy State-
ment, supra note 10, at 1-2.
34. By issuing such an inquiry, the FCC formally opened its examination of the is-
sue, and assigned it a docket number (19142). See Children's Television Programs: No-
tice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 1429 (1971) (codified
at 47 C.F.R. § 73.4050). For a detailed explanation of the process by which the FCC
issues NOIs and NPRMs, see Kunkel & Watkins, Evolution of Children's Television Reg-





1974 policy statement.3 5 The Commission found that some broad-
casters aired no programming for children, and it denounced such a
practice as "not acceptable." It noted that all broadcasters must
make a "meaningful effort" to provide programming for "both pre-
school and school-aged children," that such programs must be
scheduled for periods when children are likely viewers, and that
these programs could not be relegated to weekends only. Finally,
recognizing that this report provided the first detailed suggestions
for broadcasters to follow regarding children's programming, and
acknowledging that the policy statement was not an order in the
usual sense, the FCC indicated that systematic enforcement would
not begin beforeJanuary 1976. Docket 19142 was left open in or-
der to monitor compliance; since most dockets are closed upon issu-
ance of an order, this was intended as a signal to broadcasters that
compliance was expected and would be assessed.
Formal monitoring did not begin until 1978 at the direction of
newly installed FCC Chairman Charles Ferris, an appointee of the
Carter Administration. Under Ferris, the FCC issued a second NOI
and commissioned several studies to compare programming avail-
able at that time with programming prior to the 1974 Policy State-
ment. 36 Results of these studies, published in a 1979 Commission
report, suggested that there had been no significant increase in edu-
cational and informational programming for children. 37 The Com-
mission subsequently generated several possible strategies to
increase children's programming, and in 1980 released its NPRM,
which suggested five options, two of which involved setting specific
percentage amounts of children's programming. 38 Comment was
solicited on these options prior to what appeared to be certain im-
35. 1974 Policy Statement, supra note 10. While neither ACT proposal was specifi-
cally implemented by the 1974 Policy Statement, that statement did represent the most
detailed position taken by a regulatory body on the issue of children's television.
36. Children's Programming and Advertising Practices: Second Notice of Inquiry,
43 Fed. Reg. 37136 (1978) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73).
37. Television Programming for Children: A Report of the Children's Television
Task Force (1979) (on file with author). For a complete description of the task force
report and the FCC's response, see M. McGregor, Assessing FCC Response to Report of
Children's Television Task Force, 63 Journalism Q. 481-87, 502 (1986).
38. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices: Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 1976 (1980) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73). The
options were to rescind the 1974 Policy Statement, maintain or modify it, set uniform
national mandatory program rules of five hours per week for preschoolers and two-and-
a-half hours for elementary-aged children, set program guidelines, and rather than have
uniform rules, evaluate performance of individual broadcasters at license renewal time,
or increase the number of broadcast outlets in each market to encourage programming
specialization.
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plementation of specific requirements, either by programming quo-
tas or programming guidelines. 39
The FCC's attitude toward programming regulation, however,
underwent a major change in the next several years. 40 Under Ferris,
the Commission began to remove many rules for radio broadcasters
that it deemed unnecessary and acted to ease regulations governing
satellite broadcasting, cablecasting, and media ownership. With the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the process of deregulating pri-
vate industries accelerated. President Reagan replaced Chairman
Ferris with Mark Fowler, a staunch advocate of telecommunications
deregulation who would forcefully and "personally . . . put the
'mark' in 'marketplace.' "41 The Fowler-led FCC committed itself to
television deregulation, arguing that marketplace competition
rather than regulation should be the basis for broadcast decisions.
It proceeded to remove regulations that it felt were unnecessary and
halted the creation of new regulations in areas where it felt the mar-
ketplace should determine programming. By late 1981 the pro-
posed children's television rule-making had disappeared from the
Commission's agenda.42 When Docket 19142 was finally closed in
December 1983-and then only in the face of a lawsuit filed by
ACT-both the overall amount and creative quality of regularly
scheduled children's programming were at one of the lowest levels
in the history of television programming.
In closing one of its longest-running dockets, the FCC declared
that while it still expected the child audience to be served by broad-
39. National program rules would set a fixed amount of programming that each
broadcaster would be required to air. Any station not airing such amounts would be in
violation of the appropriate FCC regulation. Program guidelines would be suggested
amounts for broadcasters; performance would only be assessed at license renewal time,
and generally only if there were some reason to believe that a broadcaster was not fol-
lowing the broad guidelines.
40. See Kunkel & Watkins, supra note 34; Heffron, The Federal Communications
Commission and Broadcast Deregulation, in Communications Policy and the Political
Process 39-70 (J. Havlick ed. 1983).
41. Halonen, A Chairman Who Marched to His Own Drummer, 112 Broadcasting,
Mar. 23, 1987 at 51.
42. Radio deregulation had occurred first. See Deregulation of Radio: Final Rule, 46
Fed. Reg. 13888 (1981) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 915) (effective Apr. 3, 1981).
Television followed in 1984. See Revision of Programming and Commercialization Poli-
cies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Programming Log Requirements for Commer-
cial Television Stations: Final Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 33588 (1984) (to be codified at 47
C.F.R. § 73) (effective Sept. 24, 1984) [hereinafter Television Deregulation]. The Ferris
Commission held that television for children was an area in which deregulation was not
appropriate, but the Fowler-led FCC, with only Commissioner Henry Rivera consist-
ently dissenting, did not agree with this assessment. See Rubinstein & Brown, Television
and Children: A Public Policy Dilemma, in The Media, Social Science, and Social Policy




casters, individual stations might take into account services offered
by alternative technologies, such as basic and premium cable, pro-
grams aired by public television stations, and content for children
adapted to videodisc and VCRs. Programs provided by other com-
mercial broadcasters in the particular marketplace also could be
considered.
Child advocates did not greet this decision warmly. There was
and continues to be considerable fear that this decision will ulti-
mately benefit only children from middle- and upper-income fami-
lies, whose parents are able to afford the luxury of newer
technologies. This possibility is particularly disconcerting since
viewership data consistently show that disadvantaged and lower-in-
come children watch more commercial television than do children
from middle- and upper-income households, and are more likely to
believe the presentations they see there.43 Recent Nielsen data indi-
cate that lower-income children aged two to eleven watch an aver-
age of 33 hours per week; those from upper-income families watch
only about half this amount (19 hours), and middle-income children
fall between the two groups (22 hours). For adolescents, the com-
parable weekly averages are 27 hours, 19 hours, and 21 hours, re-
spectively. 44 For lower-income households, the majority of youth
viewing is of commercially broadcast fare, while for other house-
holds, cable viewing accounts for increasing percentages. Advo-
cates are concerned that for those children who need alternatives
the most, fewer and fewer will be available. Responding to the late-
December dismissal of the children's television issue, ACT de-
nounced the FCC for leaving a lump of coal in the stocking of every
American child, while providing a "great Christmas present" for the
television industry.45 Congressional detractors, who had continu-
ally battled the Fowler Commission on other public responsibility
issues, such as minority hiring, license preferences, and enforce-
ment of the Fairness Doctrine, also criticized the FCC's decision.
Nonetheless, the decision was subsequently upheld by a federal ap-
peals court in 1985.46
43. See generally G. Comstock, S. Chaffee, N. Katzman, M. McCombs & D. Roberts,
Television and Human Behavior (1978); B. Greenberg & B. Dervin, Use of the Mass
Media by the Urban Poor (1970).
44. These figures are from the A.C. Nielsen Media Research office, Northbrook, Ill.
and are based on data gathered in December, 1986.
45. FCC Strikes the Flag on Children's TV, 106 Broadcasting, Jan. 2, 1984, at 35.
46. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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In response to the alternative technologies concerns, the district
court's decision stated, in part:
As to cable ... it has a sufficiently broad and increasing presence that
the Commission may appropriately consider its offerings in determin-
ing the necessity for such nationwide rules as petitioners favored. This
does not mean . .. that in a particular service area where cable pene-
tration is insubstantial or nonexistent that medium can have any effect
upon the broadcaster's assessment of the most significant needs of his
community; or that the broadcaster in any community can disregard
the needs of those not served by cable. We also see no need for the
Commission to blind itself to the contribution of noncommercial tele-
vision. .... Congress did not intend noncommercial broadcasting to
'relieve commercial broadcasters of their responsibilities to present
public affairs and public service programs, and in general to program
their stations in the public interest.' But that does not mean that the
Commission must require commercial broadcasters to pursue those
responsibilities in disregard of the fact that some gaps in the public
interest may have been filled by that source while other needs remain
entirely unmet. 4 7
II. Obstacles to Policy Action
In the past, children's programming rarely has been profitable for
broadcasters. Ultimately, any requirement to carry a fixed amount
of child-oriented television will reduce profits to the extent that
more lucrative programming is replaced. Thus, commercial broad-
casters have been united in opposition to any pressure to provide
more than minimal levels of children's content. Their major public
argument has been that any attempt to proscribe content runs di-
rectly counter to the first amendment, and attempts to prescribe
content by organizations such as the FCC fall outside of their consti-
tutional authority, constituting a direct intrusion into the free enter-
prise of commercial broadcasting. Finally, they point out that since
the product of broadcasting is a service to the consumer, the mar-
ketplace is the preferred setting for making programming decisions.
Viewers would not watch programs if they disliked them, and alter-
natively, if certain kinds of programs were strongly desired, viewers
would make such needs known. Thus regulation is unnecessary, or
at least less desirable than marketplace forces.




A. The First Amendment Argument
Although the last few years have seen the broadcast media come
under increased first amendment protection, radio and television
have still generally been treated as different from print due to the
inherent limitations on the medium's availability. Whereas anyone
might write or print material, access to the broadcast spectrum is
restricted; there is a much larger demand for broadcast licenses than
there is spectrum space. Broadcasters must apply for a license to
broadcast on a particular frequency; once this license is awarded, no
one else in that area may legally broadcast on the same frequency.48
Thus, the courts have adopted different protection standards, 49 and
have made clear that neither the 1934 Communications Act nor the
first amendment prohibits the government from requiring content-
specific programming. 50 In an analysis prepared for Congress, Li-
brary of Congress Legislative Attorney David Siddall5' pointed out
that a number of areas exist in which courts have upheld restrictions
on broadcasters: prohibitions against obscenity and indecent pro-
gramming, 52 lottery announcements, 53 and cigarette advertise-
ments. 54  Similarly, the Red Lion decision upheld the Fairness
48. Currently television licenses are awarded for five years, at which point the hold-
ers must apply for renewal. If others apply for the same license, a comparative renewal
process ensues, at which point the applicants are matched on a number of dimensions
related to their abilities to serve in the public interest. In almost all cases, the advantage
is to the incumbent. Even if there are no competing applicants, local groups may file a
"petition to deny" if there is sentiment that the incumbent broadcaster is not serving the
public. In such cases the FCC determines whether adequate evidence exists to hold a
hearing; if no hearing is held the license application proceeds as usual. Since early 1981
the broadcast license renewal application has consisted of a postcard with five questions,
none of which assess the amount of children's programming. See Radio Broadcast Serv-
ices; Revision of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommer-
cial AM, FM, and Television Licensees: Final Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 26236 (1981) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73). Each renewal period, 5% of the applicants are randomly
selected to fill out a comprehensive form, similar to that used prior to 1981; this form
includes questions about children's programming and advertising practices.
49. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
50. See Siddall, Constitutionality of Proposals to Require Broadcast Television Pro-
grams for Children, Cong. Research Service (Apr. 3, 1984). See also Home Box Office,
Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46-48 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
51. Siddall, supra note 50.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1304, 1307(a)(2) (1976); American Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aft'd, sub non. FCC v. American Broadcasting
Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976); Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.C.1971), aff'd sub nom. Capitol Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972).
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Doctrine, which in some instances requires broadcasters to carry
certain content. 55
For a long time FCC processing guidelines used in evaluating ap-
plications for license renewals contained recommended percentages
of specific content that broadcasters must carry: news, informa-
tional, and other noncommercial material. For example, after the
1960 policy statement detailing 14 important content obligations,
the FCC directed its staff to refuse to act on applications that pro-
posed any of the following: less than 15% noncommercial program-
ming, less than 5% local live programming, more than 90% network
programming, or more than 12 commercial announcements per
hour. Broadcasters were again reminded that, absent a good expla-
nation, each must provide some combination of religious, agricul-
tural, educational, news, and discussion programming. 56 Thus, the
55. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). The Fairness Doctrine requires
broadcasters to devote time to the coverage of public issues and to ensure that reason-
able opportunity is afforded for the presentation of views on controversial issues of pub-
lic importance. In the Red Lion case, a radio station challenged the FCC requirement
that it provide free air time to an author wishing to respond to an evangelist's attack. A
U.S. Court of Appeals ruling upheld both the Fairness Doctrine and the FCC personal
attack rules. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C.Cir. 1967). During
the same period, another U.S. Court of Appeals ruling on the constitutionality of the
Fairness Doctrine found it to be in violation of the first amendment. Radio Television
News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1968). The Supreme
Court, in deciding between the two rulings, noted that the issue was one of ensuring
public service, and that the public is served only when it is guaranteed exposure to all
sides of controversial issues of public importance; the Court therefore upheld the Fair-
ness Doctrine. Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
The FCC recently ruled that enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine has a "chilling"
impact on broadcasters' willingness to air issues that are in any way controversial. The
Commission therefore vacated a 1984 order in which it had determined that a broad-
caster had violated the doctrine. The FCC specifically noted that the ruling did not
apply to "equal access" and "equal time" requirements. It also found that nothing in
the decision will limit its ability to license and regulate broacasters in the public interest.
See N.Y. Times, August 5, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
Nonetheless, Doctrine advocates in both the House and Senate maintain that the
Commission lacks the authority to end enforcement; they argue that the Doctrine is not
comprised solely of FCC policies and rulings, but is taken from the first amendment, as
well as being codified in Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ § 151 et seq. (1982), and is therefore out of the Commission's jurisdiction.
The FCC's position is supported by a recent U.S. Court of Appeals decision which
ruled that the entire Doctrine resides under the jurisdiction of the Commission. See
Telecommunications Research and Action Center and Media Access Project v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Thus legislation has been introduced to formally codify the
provisions of the Doctrine. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 3130 (1987);
H.R. 1934, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 1790 (1987). See Telecommunica-
tions Research and Action Center, A Citizens Primer on the Fairness Doctrine (1984)
and D.Pember, Mass Media Law (1984) for thorough discussions of the Doctrine.
56. Notations of General Agenda, June 28, 1961, as recalled in Television Deregula-
tion, supra note 42, at 33589. In 1976 these were superseded by guidelines calling for
no less than 5% local programming, 5% informational (news plus public affairs) pro-
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FCC has required, in the recent past, certain amounts of specific
program content, especially the kind perceived as in the public in-
terest, such as news and public affairs.
The FCC's broad program of deregulation has eliminated such
guidelines, which had existed in some form or another since 1946. 57
In the current deregulatory environment the FCC generally prefers
to avoid decisions in which content must be evaluated (although it
has made a major exception where obscene or indecent content is
concerned). The role of the Commission, in this view, is simply to
serve as a "traffic cop," setting technical standards and processing
smoothly such things as license renewal applications. However, this
recent FCC interpretation has not received complete support in sev-
eral court rulings, which have found the FCC to be not simply a
traffic agent, but a rule-making body empowered to "determin[e]
the composition of that traffic." 58 In the Red Lion case the Supreme
Court clearly stated that the FCC does not violate the law by becom-
ing involved in determining "the kinds of programs broadcast by
licensees." 59 The courts have tended to perceive the first amend-
ment as a way to guarantee access by the public to information and
ideas rather than as a protection for broadcasters. The crucial issue,
the Court observed in Red Lion, is the right of the public to "receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic (sic), moral, and other
ideas," and the purpose of the first amendment is to "preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas" rather than "to countenance mo-
nopolization of that market." 60
The intent behind specifying requirements for children's pro-
grams, as ACT had asked the FCC to do in 1970, was to guarantee
access to information for one part of the audience-children. Henry
gramming, and a minimum of 10% total nonentertainment programming. 59 FCC 2d
491, 493 (1976).
57. Television Deregulation, supra note 42, removed: (1) the program guideline per-
centages; (2) obligations that commercial broadcasters formally ascertain important
needs and problems affecting their local communities; (3) all guidelines limiting the
amount of allowable advertising; (4) the obligation that stations keep comprehensive
program logs, and that those logs be available for public inspection; and (5) the long-
form audit requirement used for license renewal. With the elimination of Form 303-C
licensees will no longer be required to present a separate list of programs designated for
children 12 years or under. A footnote indicated that it remains "part of the licensee's
general public interest obligation to examine the program needs of children and to be
ready to demonstrate its attention to those needs." Id. at 33601.
58. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
59. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). A similar decision was
reached in FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799-800
(1978) (holding that FCC's prospective ban on common ownership of newspapers and
broadcast stations was valid exercise of Commission's statutory rulemaking authority).
60. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 390 (1969).
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Geller, former head of the Carter Administration's National Tele-
communication Information Agency, has argued that since broad-
cast licensees are constitutionally required to be public trustees and
since as part of the public interest obligation both Congress and the
FCC can properly be concerned that "children receive a reasonable
amount of informational/instructional programming," it follows
that both "can specify the amount of the informational/instructional
programming to be provided by the broadcast licensee." 6' He has
posited that in the past the FCC has made decisions that involved
evaluating whether broadcasters made substantial efforts to provide
certain program content, 62 and if the FCC could make such ad hoc
decisions, it could also "proceed by a regulation that delineates the
public interest in this respect." 63 In summary, clear precedent ex-
ists for requiring certain types of content from commercial broad-
casters, and these requirements have not been found to be in
violation of the first amendment.
Historically, the rationale for removing requirements for pro-
gramming has been the belief that they were unnecessary. Thus the
logic behind recent deregulatory moves by the FCC has been its be-
lief that broadcasters already provide such services as news and local
programming not because of regulatory requirements, but because
the marketplace demands them. Additionally, Fowler's consistent
position has been that content specifications are in violation of the
spirit of the first amendment, which has also made him eager to lift
such requirements.
B. The Marketplace Argument
This argument posits that broadcasters operate not in isolation,
but in a marketplace of competing services. Broadcasters must
make decisions by taking all services into account, and by attending
both to the audience and to the competition. The most significant
aspect of the marketplace argument is that responsibility for public
61. Geller argued this point in a letter, dated March 6, 1984, to then-Rep. Timothy
Wirth. (Letter is on file with author.) Wirth was elected to the Senate in 1986.
62. In support Geller cited, among other decisions, Broadcasting Renewal Appli-
cants, 66 FCC 2d 419, 430 (1977), aff'd, Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (FCC's decision to decline to adopt quantitative program standards for
television broadcasters involved in comparative renewal proceedings held to be reason-
able and within its statutory and constitutional authority).
63. Geller cited United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (hold-
ing that rules adopted by FCC to avoid overconcentration of control of broadcasting
facilities were reconciliable with the powers of the Commission granted by the Commu-
nications Act), and FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 289 n.7 (1954). He




interest service shifts from the individual commercial broadcaster to
the collective marketplace. Individual broadcasters no longer must
provide all needed public services, and to the extent that public in-
terest services are provided within a particular broadcast market, in-
dividual broadcasters may so adjust their offerings. 64 If several all-
news stations broadcast in a single market, the responsibilities of
other broadcasters to provide news is diminished. Similarly, broad-
casters may now take into account the offerings of other outlets that
reach children when determining the extent of children's program-
ming that they must provide. The FCC has even argued that requir-
ing specific types of programs runs contrary to efforts at
specialization:
On weekends, when network stations target the child audience, the
independent (and the public) stations do not. As predicted, market
segmentation leads to station specialization better serving the needs of
the entire viewing public. Program quotas ... would work fundamen-
tally against efforts to align commercial incentives with quality service
to the child audience. 65
The major and essentially unsubstantiated premise behind the
marketplace argument is that all broadcast audiences are capable of
determining whether broadcasters are serving their interests, and if
they are not, the audiences will communicate this to them, either by
contacting the broadcasters directly, or by turning to their competi-
tors. There are no reliable and valid methods to measure such feed-
back to broadcasters, however, leaving program ratings as the only
real measure of audience attitudes and behavior. Thus, when rat-
ings demonstrate that broadcasters are losing viewers, broadcasters
respond quickly, since their advertisers might cancel in favor of the
competition or at least demand significantly lower ad rates. Note
that audiences are not consulted directly in this process.
In addition, since broadcasters wish to charge the maximum rate
to program sponsors, they attempt to reach the largest possible
share of the audience most desired by advertisers. Thus the con-
cern is not for maximum audience, but for the maximum audience de-
sired by advertisers. Given the choice of reaching equal numbers of
preschoolers or adults between 25 and 34, a broadcaster will pro-
gram for the adults, since they represent a large group of purchas-
ing consumers, attracting sponsors willing to pay the highest rates.
It is in the economic interest of the broadcaster to "please" the pub-
lic and the advertising accounts, so each attempts to provide as
64. Television Deregulation, supra note 42, at 33589.
65. 1984 Order, supra note 7, at 654.
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much mass appeal, revenue-generating programming as possible. 66
The danger comes, of course, when an emphasis on making money
overrides the commitment to provide programming in the public
interest, even if such programming does not garner the highest rat-
ings or make the largest profits.
While in the infant days of television much of the children's pro-
gramming was aired in prime time, it was soon shifted to "ghetto"
hours, either after school or Saturday mornings, times identified as
attracting the smallest adult audiences. 67 Prime time was seen as
simply too valuable to fill with content aimed at a group with low
purchasing power. This belief has not changed. Presently, even
mid-morning and early afternoons, when advertisers might target
the at-home, primarily female audience, are seen as too valuable for
children's content. This leaves a fairly fixed amount of time in
which children's programs might be broadcast. Two hours in the
morning (7 a.m. - 9 a.m.), three in the afternoon (3 p.m. - 6 p.m.),
for five weekdays, plus five hours on Saturday morning (7 a.m. - 12
noon), total 30 available hours for children.
In practice, though, many of the programs currently broadcast in
these time slots are not programs initially produced for children,
but rather syndicated reruns of adult and family situation comedy,
variety, or dramatic programs, since the costs to the broadcaster for
these syndicated offerings are generally lower than for first-run chil-
dren's fare.68 The final afternoon hour is almost always devoted to
66. The emphasis on revenue-generating programming can be seen in recent merg-
ers and takeovers of networks by other companies such as General Electric and Capital
Cities Communications. In the case of network takeovers (e.g., NBC, ABC), the initial
concern has been for "streamlining" operations. Individuals, units, and emphases seen
as unnecessary are eventually eliminated or de-emphasized, with many or even most of
these decisions based on financial grounds, since ultimately such takeovers are done for
business rather than public interests. Similarly, a network that seeks to avoid a takeover
may also find itself in a financially tenuous position, since avoidance may mean taking
out a short-term, high interest loan or selling subsidiary properties, actions that may be
almost as expensive as accepting new ownership. While CBS, for example, recently was
able to repurchase its stock and successfully avoid a takeover, such a move left the cor-
poration with considerably less cash than formerly and with a debt that rose from $386
million to $1.3 billion. See Upping the Ante: CBS Tops the Turner Offer, Time,July 15,
1985, at 49. These financial considerations will guarantee that, for the present, high-
revenue-generating programming will be a top priority at CBS in order to replenish
these funds and reduce the debt. See Days of Turbulences, Days of Change, Time, Mar.
16, 1987, at 62-4 (network news departments pressed to reduce staff and become finan-
cially profitable). News and non-entertainment programming such as public interest
fare is simply a luxury, and accorded much lower priority, as is other programming that
is not high in revenue generation, such as children's fare.
67. W. Melody, Children's Television: The Economics of Exploitation (1973).
68. Program creators generally enter into an initial contract with a network that al-
lows the network a fixed number of airings of a program; the rights to the program then




such reruns, in order to catch adolescents after school and adults
returning from work. Only eight possible program slots remain for
children's programming during weekdays, further reducing the pos-
sible weekly total to 18 half-hour slots.
Most broadcasters owned by or affiliated with one of the major
networks69 currently devote the morning times to their nationally
broadcast news and variety programs, and the afternoon hours to
adult-oriented programs such as soap operas and talk shows, rather
than to shows aimed at a child or youth audience. For example, in
the current Detroit market, each network affiliate devotes one-half
hour a day to the child/youth audience, offering reruns of Taxi
(ABC), Benson (CBS), and TheJeffersons (NBC) during late afternoon.
One day each month, on the average, a one-hour special may be
offered to the child audience by each of the three major networks.70
Therefore, in practice, network-affiliated broadcasters presently
offer a maximum of 10 children's programs, concentrated during
Saturday morning.71 Only the independent broadcasters provide
regularly scheduled weekday programs for children. Most of these,
though, are not produced for informational purposes, but rather are
predominantly product-oriented programs, or what have come to be
known as "30-minute commercials." Such cartoons, created in con-
junction with a line of toys, are often produced by the adver-
tiser/manufacturer, aim to popularize the characters, and therefore
to increase toy sales. Some of the more popular product programs
currently syndicated include Ghostbusters, Rambo, He-Man and the Mas-
ters of the Universe, She-Ra: Princess of Power, Transformers, Care Bears,
and Laser Tag Academy. The cost to the broadcaster for such direct-
with individual stations, which purchase rights to air the subsequent reruns of the
program.
69. Stations owned and operated by one of the commercial networks, and each of
their affiliates, receive much of their programming from that network, usually by direct
feed at broadcast time. Independents are not affiliated with the major commercial net-
works and therefore seek other methods of obtaining programming. This usually means
paying for the rights to air syndicated programs, which often are programs formerly
broadcast on commercial television.
70. ABC Afterschool Special, CBS Schoolbreak Special, and NBC's M'ain Street are offered
approximately once a month during the school year (Sept.-May); intended audience for
the ABC and CBS programs vary, while the NBC program is intended for adolescents.
In addition, CBS offers its Festival of the Lively Arts for a child audience on a "very irregu-
lar" basis, according to the CBS Programming division.
71. Some evidence suggests that at least one of the major networks is considering
replacing its Saturday morning children's programming with programming geared to-
ward adults; early in 1987, NBC Entertainment President Brandon Tartikoff suggested
the Saturday morning time slot as appropriate for a weekend version of the Today show,
for example. Network Children's Programming Regains Ads from Syndication, 108
Broadcasting, Apr. 13, 1987, at 85.
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to-syndication product programs is less than for those not produced
by toy manufacturers,7 2 and therefore "30-minute commercials"
often make up a considerable percentage of independent offerings
before and after school.
As a result of this economic reality there is generally no standard
weekday fare for children on stations owned by or affiliated with the
major networks (comprising about 70% of all commercial television
broadcasters), 73 and programming on independents is primarily
provided by advertisers as a message to promote products. Tables 1
and 2 represent the typical weekly schedule of children's programs
from the Detroit market, which is fairly representative. Note in par-
ticular how the network affiliates and the independents "work to-
gether" (i.e., the absence of children's programs on the network
affiliates during all times except Saturday mornings, and the compa-
rable absence of such programs on the independents during Satur-
72. A forthcoming book by a long-time children's marketing executive (Schneider,
Children's TV Marketing, 1987) indicates that there are currently 42 such syndicated
features from which broadcasters might choose. See also Licensing escalates from '50s
and '60s "child's play," 6 Electronic Media, January 19, 1987, at 186-214. ACT Presi-
dent Peggy Charren, in a speech to a child development conference on April 23, 1987,
indicated that at least 65 30-minute commercials were presently available. The recent
practice of "barter syndication" has made this situation possible. Under barter syndica-
tion, a program distributor/manufacturer/advertiser provides programming to a station
at a significantly reduced price (sometimes at no cost) in exchange for the advertising
slots during the program. These slots are then used by the distributor/advertiser to
promote other similar products (for example, advertising He-Man products on She-Ra:
Princess of Power) or sold to other advertisers.
Prior to the current emphasis on deregulation, the FCC forcefully had gone on record
against such programming. In 1969, Topper Corporation complained that its competi-
tor, Mattel Incorporated, was violating an FCC guideline on maximum commercial min-
utes during children's programming-at that time limited to 16 minutes per hour-by
airing a 30-minute program based on its "Hot Wheels" toys. Topper contended that
since the toys were used in the program, and the name "Hot Wheels" was included in
the title, the situation essentially amounted to Mattel receiving commercial promotion
during much of the show. In a preliminary opinion, the Commission agreed, and found
the matter "disturbing." See In re Complaint of Topper Corp. Concerning American
Broadcasting Co. and Mattel Inc., 21 FCC 2d 148 (1970). The FCC chastized Mattel
and ABC, the network airing the Saturday morning program, for subordinating pro-
gramming in the public interest to programming in the interest of profit. Before the
FCC could issue a final order, the network stopped showing the program. However, the
Commission felt the issue was important enough to reiterate its position in its subse-
quent 1974 Policy Statement: "the Commission wishes to caution licensees against en-
gaging in practices in the body of the program itself which promote products in such a
way that they may constitute advertising." 1974 Policy Statement, supra note 10, at 17
(citing Hot Wheels as an example of such a program). To their credit, the three major
networks resisted airing 30-minute commercials for several years, until such resistance
presented clear financial difficulties for their affiliates.
73. Figures indicate that at the end of 1985, 632 of the 922 commercial stations in
operation were owned by or affiliated with one of the three networks. See Broadcasting




























































day morning). Note also the preponderance of 30-minute
commercials on the independent stations.
This analysis of representative offerings for children suggests that
commercial broadcasters are not providing significant educational
and informational content for children. The needs of children are
not necessarily served simply because more signals are received in a
market.7 4 Commercial broadcasting represents the major delivery
system for many children who live in large cities, and particularly
those living in the inner city. These children generally have no ac-
cess to alternative technologies, such as basic or premium cable ser-
vice. Because of prohibitive costs as well as lower-than-average
subscription success, large cities-and particularly inner cities-are
usually the last to be wired for cable. Additionally, in many markets,
network affiliates control the "best" broadcast frequencies, the VHF
(very-high frequency) channels. Public broadcasting and independ-
ent stations are relegated to UHF (ultra-high frequency) channels,
on which signal quality is poorer than that on VHF stations. 75
Therefore viewing public broadcasting fare is more difficult and less
satisfying than commercial programming. And obviously, "signals"
on VCRs and videodiscs are received only in households that are
able to purchase the necessary equipment. Thus, commercial
broadcast signals remain the major delivery vehicle for a significant
percentage of American children.
At the same time that the FCC has been following its marketplace
philosophy, others more familiar with children's television have
warned of problems. In testimony before the FCC in April of 1983,
Robert Keeshan, for many years "Captain Kangaroo" on CBS,
pointed out that networks were having considerable difficulty get-
ting their affiliates to run children's programming. 76 Thus it was
74. A recent federal appeals court found that the FCC's general deregulation of tele-
vision commercialization did not justify its termination of commercialization guidelines
in the "special realm" of children's television. Action for Children's Television v.
F.C.C., 821 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C.Cir. 1987). The Court held that the Commission had
failed to explain adequately the elimination of its long-standing children's television
commercialization guidelines and therefore remanded the case to the Commission for
further explanation of its decision. ACT has asked that the guidelines be enforced while
the FCC reconsiders its decision.
75. According to Broadcasting Cablecasting Yearbook 1986, supra note 73, at A2, 62
percent of all public television stations were broadcasting on UHF at the beginning of
1986, compared with 41 percent of commercial broadcasts.
76. Robert Keeshan, Oral Testimony, FCC En Banc Meeting In re Children's Televi-
sion Programming (April 28, 1983) (author's notes). Keeshan's Captain Kangaroo was
eventually taken off the air by the network, which cited as a reason the failure of affiliates
to carry it. While affiliates have the option not to carry the programming provided by
their networks, in practice this option is very cautiously exercised.
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not in the best interests of networks to expend considerable effort
and funding for new high quality informational television if affiliates
would rather choose lower-cost syndicated programs. To the extent
that such syndicated programs were less expensive to acquire, and
resulted in higher ratings per dollar spent, Keeshan argued, the de-
cision was simply an economic one. Lou Scheimer, president of
Filmation Studios, which produced the highly successful Fat Albert
and the Cosby Kids, indicated at a 1983 conference in celebration of
National Children and Television Week 77 that his production house
had proposed a number of similar educational-yet-entertaining pro-
grams for children of various ages. The commercial broadcast com-
munity, however, has shown no interest, so there was no incentive
to invest either creative effort or funding.
This analysis of the commercially broadcast educational and infor-
mational content available for children indicates that the market-
place alone cannot produce adequate television programming for
children. While the FCC has argued the opposite view, it has not
documented its position with a systematic investigation of the im-
pact of the deregulation decisions on the quantity of children's tele-
vision. In late 1983, however, a congressional study of available
children's educational television revealed an average of 61 minutes
a week of such content, out of a total of 4.5 hours of children's con-
tent. This is contrasted with an average of four hours a day of child
viewing.78 The marketplace for creative endeavors in children's
programming is restricted, whereas the marketplace for adult pro-
gramming is diverse. The diversity sought by the FCC in its deregu-
77. The March 13, 1983 conference, sponsored by the UCLA Bush Foundation
Training Program in Child Development and Social Policy, brought together research-
ers, policymakers, and individuals in television's creative community to recognize the
medium's positive contributions and explore ways to encourage and support such pro-
gramming. Of the seven network-aired programs honored at that time, four are no
longer regularly broadcast on network affiliates: Captain Kangaroo, Fat Albert and the Cosby
Kids, CBS Festival of Lively Arts for Young People, and The CBS Library; two remain on the
Saturday morning schedule: Smurfs, ABC Weekend Special; the remaining program, CBS
Afternoon Playhouse, now called CBS Schoolbreak Special, appears on the average of once a
month. In contrast, many of the honored programs appearing on cable (Against the Odds,
Fraggle Rock, Pinwheel) and public broadcasting (The Electric Company, Mister Rogers' Neigh-
borhood, Sesame Street, 3-2-1 Contact) are still aired on a daily basis, and of the public
broadcasting programming, all but Electric Company continues to produce new episodes.
78. The analysis was carried out by subcommittee staff and presented during testi-
mony at Potential of Television in Educating Children: Joint Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Telecommunication, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce and the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational
Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1983). For





lation of broadcasting has failed to materialize in the area of
programming for children.
IlL Policy Options
Despite these institutional and policy constraints, there have been
some attempts to improve the quantity and quality of programs di-
rected at children and adolescents. Public interest groups such as
ACT have worked to keep the issue in the forefront of public atten-
tion, and to hold policy makers, especially the FCC, accountable for
communication policy decisions that have an impact on children.
Legislative solutions have generally sought to create an artificial
marketplace for children's television by requiring broadcasters to
carry a certain amount or percentage of children's programming.
Others have sought to create or improve the market by offering
monetary incentives. Proposed tax incentives have been aimed at
individual broadcasters who air informational children's program-
ming and at corporations for sponsoring the creation or airing of
such programming. 79 Others have not sought legal solutions, but
have attempted to work within the industry. These groups have
suggested a national center for children's television, 80 workshops to
educate creators and producers of children's programming,
fundraising for children's television by the broadcast community,
79. A related method involved the imposition of a tax on new television sets, with
the proceeds to be directed toward funding of creative programming aimed at child
audiences. This type of tax was first suggested in 1967 by the Carnegie Commission on
Educational Television, supra note 30, which proposed it as a method to partially fund
the nation's "new" public broadcasting network. The television set tax recommenda-
tion was not implemented; Congress preferred that public broadcasting be funded by a
combination of existing governmental money and other public and private support.
80. Probably one of the most complete analyses of options for children's television
was prepared by Eli Rubinstein, one of the editors of the 1972 Surgeon General's Re-
port, supra note 6. His options paper (dated Aug. 13, 1982, on file with author) was
prepared for a 1982 meeting to explore policy implications of the 10-year update to the
Report (D. Pearl, L. Bouthilet & J. Lazar, supra note 27). Major options discussed by
Rubinstein included: creating a national center for children's television; establishing a
television research facility within the industry to focus on action-oriented research; for-
mation of a high-level public commission on the future of television and children;
greater involvement by governmental and corporate entities; and a tax on the sales of
new television sets. After exploring the arguments for and against each of 15 options,
Rubinstein avoided indicating one or more as preferable, injecting a note of caution:
"The new technologies and the changing structure of the television industry may pro-
duce such a rapidly moving target that no presently conceived option can appropriately
anticipate these changes. Such a contingency only further complicates an already com-
plex policy issue."
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and the provision of incentives and awards for high-quality chil-
dren's programming.8 '
Most of the options suggested have not generated adequate sup-
port within the broadcasting industry, the government, or at the
grass roots level. Solutions that involve expenditures of govern-
mental funds have been perceived as unnecessary and undesirable.
The broadcast industry is already seen as lucrative, and funneling
tax money to members of this community seems excessive. While
the idea of a center for television has gathered a number of propo-
nents, inadequate commitment by federal agencies, disinterest by
the broadcast industry, and a general lack of specific focus and di-
rection for such a center, have kept it at the idea rather than the
implementation stage. And, while the broadcasting industry con-
tains many committed individuals, their commitment amounts to
very little in an industry ruled by the "bottom-line" process of deci-
sion-making. Thus, educating producers and other industry person-
nel, and providing awards for high-quality programming, have not
achieved the desired result of improved and increased television
content for children. The approaches that have gathered the most
support, if not resulted in the most progress, have been the move to
create an artificial market for children's programming and the
search for methods to fund and otherwise stimulate the production
of such programming.
A. Creation of an Artificial Marketplace
The Children's Television Education Act of 1983,2 introduced by
Representative Timothy Wirth, at that time Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and
Finance, would have required broadcasters to provide a minimum of
one hour of educational/information programming for children a
day. More recently, another Wirth-sponsored bill, the Children's
81. While not directly aimed at improving the quality of children's television, several
attempts have been made to boycott the sponsors of programs deemed offensive by
particular groups. These boycotts have not been supported by the major groups inter-
ested in improving children's programming. ACT, for example, has not countenanced
any attempts at censorship and has worked instead at increasing diversity of available
content. The major boycott efforts have been led as part of a religious crusade by the
Rev. Donald Wildmon, Chairman of the Tupelo, Mississippi-based Coalition for Better
TV; by all accounts but his own, the attempts have not been successful. See Crusade Sets
Out to Clean Up TV, 100 Broadcasting, Feb. 9, 1981, at 27.




Television Education Act of 1985,83 would have introduced guide-
lines suggesting that each commercial broadcaster air a minimum of
seven hours a week of educational/informational fare, five of which
must be during weekdays. Such an approach was intended to ac-
complish two objectives. First, it would guarantee an available mar-
ketplace for new, innovative programming aimed at educating,
informing, and entertaining children and youth. Second, it would
bring the networks back into the business of providing programs for
children to their broadcast affiliates. With their affiliates' license-
renewal decisions based in part on the amount of children's pro-
gramming provided, the networks therefore could resume produc-
tion and support of such fare, which is now provided infrequently as
monthly "specials." 84
The major obstacle to the creation of a federally-mandated mar-
ketplace for children's television has been the broadcasters them-
selves, who are adamantly opposed to such interference. To this
point, the broadcast lobby has been able to muster legislative sup-
port to counter proposals mandating children's programming. 85
While their major argument has been of the censorship/first amend-
ment variety, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) also
has questioned the role television should be assuming in the educa-
tion of American children:
Indeed one can question the advisability of creating more program-
ming to attract young viewers from other pursuits (e.g. reading, athlet-
ics, etc.) critical to their development. Determining a certain number
of children's programming hours also presupposes that children, in
fact, should be watching a specific number of hours of television.
83. H.R. 3216, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. E3763 (1985). Identical legis-
lation also was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Frank Lautenberg as S. 1594, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S10914 (1985).
84. One criticism of the early Wirth bill, H.R. 4097, supra note 82, was that it would
somehow mandate a national curriculum, or place the government in the position of a
"national nanny." The 1985 Wirth/Lautenberg legislation attempted to move the en-
forcement and monitoring back to the local level; rather than set a requisite amount of
hours, the bill simply required that the FCC immediately schedule a hearing on any local
"petition to deny" a license application or renewal that alleged that the applicant had
failed to broadcast seven hours a week of children's programming, with five of those
hours aired Monday through Friday. Thus the numbers were stated as content guide-
lines, and active monitoring and interest at the local level would replace federal over-
sight and monitoring.
85. Broadcasters have developed into a very powerful lobbying force, one that few
legislators can ignore without consequences. This is especially true for Representatives,
who must seek election every other year. Local broadcasters represent a major commu-
nications medium by which elected officials communicate to constituencies, and by
which others publicly evaluate the performance of their elected officials.
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These decisions should be left to families and educators, not to our
legislators, regulatory commissions or broadcasters.8 6
Of course the goal of children's programming advocates is not to
see broadcasters flood all children's free time with video content
that would prevent them from enjoying alternatives to viewing.
Rather, they have suggested simply that of the time that broadcast-
ers do program for children, some small part be devoted to educa-
tional and informational programming. The concerns raised by the
NAB never prevented broadcasters from promising the delivery of a
child audience to advertisers of toys, candy, cereals, and snack
foods. Nor have these concerns prompted them to ensure that a
major portion of their offerings to the child audience educate chil-
dren in these valued areas by, for example, bringing literature and
the classics alive, or providing real cultural and arts entertainment
for a small part of the broadcast day.
While Wirth's proposed legislation gained support from various
public interest and advocacy groups, such as ACT, PTA, and NEA,
the bills never received adequate congressional support, due in no
small part to broadcast industry opposition. Neither bill ever
reached a vote, even at the subcommittee level. Yet broadcasters
are unlikely to abandon their opposition to program mandates in
the near future. Congress is also unlikely to abandon its pressure,
especially given the FCC's failure to enforce, even minimally, its
1974 Policy Statement. Such legislation does serve to inform broad-
casters that programming for children remains an issue at the na-
tional level and to let the FCC know that Congress feels the
Commission must continue to enforce the public interest standard
where children are concerned.
B. Content For the Marketplace
A related policy approach is aimed at providing funds for creative
endeavors. It is important that the creative community perceive a
need and available market for the service and product it provides.
Indeed, the number of production companies that provide content
for commercial television is actually quite limited. New production
companies find it relatively difficult to compete with those that have
86. Written response to the FCC's 1983 Report and Order by the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (NAB), Feb. 24, 1984, at 9 (on file with the Yale Law & Policy
Review). In the same paper in which they questioned whether children should be watch-
ing television at all, the NAB affirmed that its members would "continue to serve the




already established network ties.8 7 While some children's program
series, especially cartoons, are "picked up" after a storyboard pres-
entation by an established production studio, newcomers are often
required to present at least one complete animated program. The
expense involved tends to be prohibitive, keeping many production
companies out of the competitive setting. In 1977, and again in
1979, SenatorJohn Heinz introduced bills designed to address this
situation. The legislation88 would have established a National En-
dowment for Children's Television, with its primary function to
raise and disburse money to stimulate the creation and production
of television programming for children. Included were recommen-
dations to fund "projects and productions which have substantial
artistic or educational significance and which meet high standards of
merit," and those "projects and productions of an experimental na-
ture which may reasonably be expected to contribute to the quality
of television programming for children." The bill was also intended
to stimulate alternatives by organizing or funding "workshops, insti-
tutes, and training programs in the field of television programming
for children" as well as research and other relevant projects. Thus it
was aimed at bypassing the usual institutional constraints and barri-
ers to entry that have plagued creative production organizations in
the past.
The Heinz approach was not successful. Neither bill ever was
voted on at committee level, nor were companion measures intro-
duced in the House. A need for an endowment and center was not
recognized by all the groups whose commitment was necessary:
academics, governmental organizations, and industry representa-
tives. The approach also suffered from the negative connotations
involved with spending federal money for creative endeavors in a
87. See generally Melody, supra note 67.
88. The 1977 (S. 1960, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 25398-25400) and
1979 (S. 1823, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 124 Cong. Rec. 26286) bills were the outcome of
discussions and recommendations of participants in an earlier conference that explored
the problems and strengths of a nationwide endowment for children's broadcasting.
The conference, held in Princeton and funded by the John and Mary R. Markle Founda-
tion, made its recommendations in a final report entitled Toward a National Endowment
for Children's Broadcasting (1977). The author and project director, Nicholas B. Van
Dyck, participated in the creation of the National Council for Children and Television
(now National Council for Families and Television), a policy-oriented group that at-
tempts to encourage communication and activities among members of the television
broadcast and production community, those from the academic research world, and in-
dividuals with policy goals. Several years later, the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Stud-
ies hosted a related conference on proposals for an even more comprehensive center for
the study of television. See W.R. Neuman, The Social Impact of Television: A Research
Agenda for the 1980's (1981).
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high-profit industry like commercial broadcasting. Eli Rubinstein 9
also suggested that a centralized endowment was perceived as detri-
mental to existing support by other federal agencies that sponsor
research and programming endeavors for children's television.
Thus there was some fear that such a center might actually produce
a decrease in federal efforts for children and television. Rubenstein
also noted that commercial broadcasters raised considerable con-
cerns about federal intrusion, arguing that a federally funded opera-
tion would introduce the undesirable specter of governmental
control of children's programming.
C. Industry Initiatives
Broadcasters continue to resist attempts by legislators to improve
television for children. Indeed, they have come to recognize that it
is in their best interests not simply to oppose such efforts once un-
derway, but actively to prevent them. Although the NAB, the most
powerful lobbying organization for the industry, has recently indi-
cated that members might be interested in raising funds to enhance
the production of children's and other alternative television pro-
grams, the seriousness of their concern is questionable. Reasoning
that if children's fare were adequate, regulators would be less likely
to seek legislative solutions, they have formed a committee to work
with government and industry representatives to seek methods by
which the NAB might contribute to a stronger public broadcasting
presence, and particularly to an improvement in programming for
specialized audiences, such as children. 0°
While it would seem illogical for commercial broadcasters to en-
courage and support public broadcasting, ostensibly a competitor,
the current era of deregulation has made for strange bedfellows. To
the extent that the FCC bases its requirements of commercial broad-
casters on the offerings of the marketplace, a strong public broad-
casting system, offering adequate educational, cultural,
informational, and children's programming, would relieve broad-
casters of similar programming requirements. Therefore, an even
larger percentage of their programming might be devoted to
higher-profit enterprises. The NAB has made a preliminary sugges-
tion to hold a yearly telethon, with money then earmarked for crea-
tive endeavors. No concrete recommendations have emerged in the
89. See Neuman, supra note 88, at 39.





almost-two-year period since the original suggestion, however.
None are likely to emerge, unless the broadcasters are faced with
particularly threatening legislation. Indeed, much of their willing-
ness to begin discussions on the provision of alternative program-
ming probably stemmed from Congress' continual threat to
mandate specified program amounts.9 1 Thus it is unlikely that any
concrete proposals regarding commercial broadcaster efforts for
supporting alternative programming will emerge unless they are
once again faced with "unfriendly" legislation, at which time the
suggestion may suddenly re-emerge in the context of compromise. 92
D. Alternatives to Commercially Broadcast Content
Since a major argument for eased broadcaster requirements has
focused on the alternative technologies and content available in the
marketplace, an option to guarantee adequate informational and ed-
ucational programming for children must both strengthen alterna-
tive programming sources and guarantee adequate access to such
content by all children, regardless of income level.
1. Public television. Public broadcasting in particular has been
cited often as being primarily responsible for providing program-
ming for children. Since the FCC has placed much of the responsi-
91. During the 98th Congress, broadcasters reacted in a like manner to the threat of
restrictions on alcohol advertising. A public interest group had amassed over 1,000,000
signatures on a national petition to ban or otherwise restrict alcohol advertisements on
electronic media, and legislation had been introduced in Congress that would have re-
quired broadcasters to air anti-alcohol messages in proportion to the number of alcohol
advertisements broadcast. See H.R. 2526, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. H3264
(1985). Faced with the loss of considerable revenue, the broadcasters set about to prove
their concern for the issue of alcohol abuse. At the local level, they increased the
number of public service ads dealing with drinking and driving. At the national level,
they lobbied hard to prevent any votes on the alcohol advertising legislation. They con-
vinced key legislators that broadcasters act responsibly without governmental mandates,
but the threat of such legislation kept the broadcast lobby "well-behaved" through the
99th Congress.
92. Using such leverage in the legislative context is not uncommon. For example,
during the 98th Congress, legislation was introduced to codify the FCC's deregulation
orders, thus changing them from simply FCC policies to federal law. See H.R. 2382,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H1809 (1983). In addition, this legislation would
have eliminated the comparative renewal process, essentially guaranteeing broadcasters
licenses for perpetuity, and further removing broadcasters from public pressures and
demands. While the legislation had over half of the total membership of the House as
co-sponsors (235 on Mar. 28, 1984), Wirth indicated that he would not schedule it for a
subcommittee vote unless broadcasters who supported the legislation were willing to
compromise. Terms of compromise listed by Wirth included acceptance of mandatory
children's programming requirements of up to five hours a week and a formal review of
the impact of the FCC's radio deregulation after five years. See 106 Broadcasting, Feb. 6,
1984, at 50 and 106 Broadcasting, May 7, 1984, at 85. The compromise ultimately
failed, and the legislation died at the end of the congressional session.
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bility for programming for children on the national public broadcast
system, public broadcasting must be supported and strengthened.
Since their inception, the nation's public broadcasting stations have
more than fulfilled their obligations to children by providing a daily
diet of programming, aimed at both at-home and in-school audi-
ences, and addressing the interests and needs of specific age groups.
Indeed, some of the best and most creative public broadcast pro-
gramming has been its children's fare: Sesame Street, 3-2-1 Contact,
Reading Rainbow, and recently the new mathematics series, Square
One.
Under the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, public funds are ap-
propriated for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),
which is an independent nongovernmental body created to disburse
federal support and to insulate public broadcasters from the polit-
ical pressure usually associated with governmental financing. 93 CPB
then distributes the funds to individual stations, to the Public
Broadcasting Service (PBS), which is an organization responsible for
creating, producing, or otherwise distributing public broadcast pro-
gramming, to other production companies-such as Children's Tel-
evision Workshop (CTW)-and to other associated ventures, such
as research. Production companies are responsible for raising ade-
quate money for the creation and support of its programming ef-
forts, including but not limited to children's programs. Thus PBS
and other production companies use CPB money, contributions
from individual stations, and money from other public and private
corporate sponsors to underwrite production costs. 9 4
Indeed, the majority of funds for public broadcasting, money
used both to create programming and to support the stations airing
the programs, comes not from the government but from corporate
sponsors, individual contributors, affiliated universities, and individ-
ual states. By 1977, for example, federal funds accounted for only
28% of public broadcasting's income. State and local governments
accounted for 29%, university, business, and individual contribu-
tions accounted for 32%, and private and public foundation support
accounted for 11%. The percentage of support supplied by the fed-
eral government has continued to shrink; a recent estimate, by the
general manager of Chicago's public television affiliate WTTW, is
93. Separate funds also are allocated for the Public Telecommunications Facilities
Program, and go toward repairing, maintaining, and replacing necessary equipment for
individual public broadcasting stations.
94. For example, Square One was created by CTW on a $16 million budget, combin-
ing funds from CPB, DOE, NSF, the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Carnegie Cor-
poration of New York, and the International Business Machines Corporation. See N.Y.




that only 15% of public television's income is from federal funds.95
Approximately 80% of this money is from CPB, and 20% is from
agencies such as the Department of Education (DOE), the National
Science Foundation (NSF), the National Endowment for the Arts
(NEA), and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH).
For the responsibilities it is given, public broadcasting is signifi-
cantly underfunded. The $200 million it received this past year
must be divided between public television and radio. Both have
been at considerable risk since 1981, about the same time that the
FCC began to place increasing responsibility on it to serve the spe-
cialized interests of the public. The level of federal support neces-
sary for public broadcasting to provide meaningful alternative
content would be at least two to three times what it presently re-
ceives. Indeed former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, testi-
fying at a 1972 hearing, recommended that a minimum of $500
million per year be allocated to CPB to allow it truly to function as
an alternative to commercial broadcasting. 96 Johnson also noted
that while the U.S. "need[ed] a strong public broadcasting service
more than any other nation ... to counteract commercial broadcast-
ing .... we fund our modest efforts at a lower proportion of our
gross national product than virtually any other civilized nation." 97
Years later, in its 1979 evaluation of the success of public broadcast-
ing, the Carnegie Commission recommended that the minimum
yearly federal contribution to the system be $590 million-in 1979
dollars.98 Despite these recommendations, funding never has
reached this level, and the current level of appropriation, $200 mil-
lion, represents only slightly more than contributions during the
late 1970s, adjusting for inflation. 9 9
Besides its difficulties with strictly economic considerations, fund-
ing for public broadcasting has often been the center of political
battles. During the Nixon Administration, for example, it was rec-
ommended that funds be denied because the programming was per-
ceived as philosophically liberal and representative of the politics
and values of the "Eastern-intellectual" establishment. 0 0 Follow-
95. 112 Broadcasting, Jan. 26, 1987, at 22. These figures were confirmed by Peggy
Hubble, Director of Press Relations for PBS, in a telephone interview.
96. Surgeon General's Report by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Television
and Social Behavior: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Sen.
Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 118 (1972).
97. Id.
98. Carnegie Comm'n on the Future of Public Broadcasting: A Public Trust 118
(1979) [hereinafter Carnegie Commission].
99. $135.3 million in 1977; $138.2 million in 1978. See Carnegie Commission, supra
note 98, at 42, 52.
100. Id. at 41-42.
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ing these threats, Congress changed the process by which money
was authorized, incorporating a process of forward funding for a
period of years in order to decrease the likelihood of political pres-
sures affecting public broadcasting content.
Yet funding and support continues to be tied to political and phil-
osophical evaluations. Indeed, the present Administration has not
been supportive of either the concept or the funding of public
broadcasting. During the 98th Congress, President Reagan vetoed
two public broadcasting funding bills, which had received significant
bipartisan support in both the House and Senate.' 0 ' In addition,
the administration requested from Congress a recision of $14 mil-
lion from the already approved budget for public broadcasting, a
request that Congress refused. Current administration budget re-
quests ask for recisions of $44 million from $214 million already
authorized for 1988, and $88 million from the $228 million author-
ized for 1989. The "savings" of $132 million is what the Adminis-
tration recommends for public broadcasting during 1990.
While in the past, public broadcasting stations as well as PBS and
various production organizations have attempted to supplement,
and in some instances replace, inadequate federal support with cor-
porate sponsorship and program underwriting, such an approach
seems increasingly problematic. For example, several large under-
writers (e.g., Exxon for Great Performances, United Technologies for
3-2-1 Contact) have withdrawn or significantly reduced their support,
and changes in the new tax law regarding contributions may result
in further erosion of corporate sponsorship. Tight federal money at
agencies such as NSF, DOE, NEA, and NEH also means diminished
support for public programming. Since 20% of all federal funds re-
ceived by public television during the past year represent money
from agencies other than CPB, additional loss would leave a very
serious gap in the nation's public broadcasting potential for chil-
dren. Due to recent budget restrictions, and the resultant cutback
in the amount of money available for new program production, cre-
ators of popular PBS children's programs find that they are unable
to create and produce as many new episodes of ongoing series as
they had formerly; increasingly, children's programing on public
broadcasting affiliates consists of rerun episodes.
2. Alternative technologies. A growing reliance on service by al-
ternative technologies also means that children not served by cable,
101. Both S. 607, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S1725 (1983) and S. 2436
98th Cong., 2nd Sess., 130 Cong. Rec. S2854 (1984) were vetoed; President Reagan




satellite broadcasting, or low-power television, and without access
to VCRs, are least likely to benefit from the current state of "diver-
sity." The irony of this situation already has been mentioned:
lower-income children, with fewer alternative sources for experienc-
ing the world in general than children of other income levels, rely
on television considerably more for information. With many of the
positive children's offerings moving to cable and VCRs, these chil-
dren will be denied the benefits that creative video offers to chil-
dren. Low-income children will increasingly be at the mercy of
commercial broadcasters who see them not as a future generation to
be taught and nurtured but simply as potential consumers. It is not
meaningful to children from families without VCR equipment that
new and creative alternatives exist on cassettes. Indeed, while pro-
duction efforts from several creative organizations are bypassing
commercial television and focusing on first-run educational and in-
formational content for VCRs, it is unlikely that those children most
in need of educational fare will have access to this programming.
Therefore, policy efforts must center on methods to provide eco-
nomically disadvantaged children with access to these alternative
technologies. 0 2 Libraries must be adequately equipped with facili-
ties for receiving, recording, and showing cable programming for
children. The national education budget must contain adequate
money to support VCR technology in public schools. Such support
must be not only for the equipment and hardware but also for com-
pensating staff so that the equipment, as well as the educational con-
tent for the equipment, is available to children, during and after
school times.
The issue faced here is quite similar to that faced by policymakers
who seek to guarantee all schoolchildren equal access to microcom-
puter technology. Early policy efforts in this regard proposed es-
sentially indiscriminate use of federal funds to purchase hardware
for all school systems. It soon became clear, however, that there
was a differential need, and that school districts in well-to-do areas
already owned adequate numbers of microcomputers. These dis-
tricts needed, more than anything, adequate creative software to use
on the microcomputers. Many school districts had no microcom-
puters, though, and therefore, for them, concerns about software
were one step removed. More recent policy approaches have
targeted federal support for hardware for these specific schools, and
have devoted the bulk of recommended spending to creative con-
tent for the systems. A similar two-pronged approach might be
102. Many thanks to Peggy Charren for this insight.
379
Yale Law & Policy Review
used to guarantee that in low-income school districts children have
access to all means of video technology; remaining federal efforts
could then be concentrated on the content of the technology.' 0 3
Conclusion
The point must be made, and made again, that television serves as
a major part of the educational curriculum of American children.
Teaching and learning, intended or unintended, take place when-
ever children watch television. The government should recognize
rather than ignore this phenomenon and support positive educa-
tional programming for children. Since the alternative technologies
argument is not likely to be abandoned, no alternative exists to a
strong and consistent federal commitment to public broadcasting.
Governmental organizations such as NSF, NEH, NEA, and DOE
must have the budget and the vision-as in the case of Square One-
to help underwrite the creation of educational video, be it broadcast
or produced for VCR. Educational production is expensive, in
terms of both effort and money. VCR material produced with an
educational intent must be accessible at a modest price to all fami-
lies and schools. Certainly the price should be comparable to video
content produced or underwritten by advertisers and toy manufac-
turers. To the extent that toy companies begin to underwrite the
creation of VCR materials, much as they do with broadcast pro-
gramming, the costs of such material will be artificially lower than
that of equally entertaining but more educational materials. Gov-
ernment agencies should work to ensure that educational program-
ming is not squeezed out of the market.
Public interest groups supportive of television for children, such
as ACT, must continue to receive support-financial, moral, and
political. At a time when the relatively disadvantaged and powerless
have little access to lobbying representatives, ACT has continued to
press broadcasters to fulfill their legal responsibilities, and they have
done so in the face of continued setbacks and failures. ACT has
filed countless lawsuits to protect children from commercial ex-
ploitation and to work towards real diversity in the children's video
103. Some will argue that these are responsibilities of the private sector, and in most
cases they are correct. However, performance of the private sector in this case has been
dismal, as has federal oversight by the FCC, which is charged with ensuring that the
private sector has adequate motivation to perform properly. In the absence of an FCC
reversal of its "hands off" position in the case of television for children, other measures
must be taken. Of course, if the FCC were more diligent, there would be no need to




marketplace. 104 While it may sometimes seem that the quantity and
quality of fare for children may not be appreciably better than when
the organization began in 1968, it is likely that without ACT, there
would be no commercially broadcast fare for children at all.
Whatever positive there is in television for children, most of it can
be attributed to efforts of groups such as Action for Children's
Television.
But, by themselves, such efforts are not enough. Those in gov-
ernment should exercise their legal authority to ensure that broad-
casters offer adequate programming for children as an integral part
of their obligation to serve in the public interest. To ensure equal
access to informational television for all children, government
should renew and increase its commitment to public television as
well as to bringing alternative technologies to lower-income chil-
dren. And public interest groups must be given the resources nec-
essary to continue their striving for excellence in children's
television. It will take the combined efforts of government agencies,
industry leaders, and public interest advocates to overcome the fail-
ure of the marketplace to protect the interests of our children.
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104. For a partial listing, see C. Alperowicz & R. Krock, Rocking the Boat: Celebrat-
ing Fifteen Years of Action for Children's Television (1983).
